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Smernoff: Presumption of Paternity

COMMENT

CALIFORNIA'S CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
OF PATERNITY AND THE EXPANSION OF
UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS

1. INTRODUCTION

California's conclusive presumption of paternity provides
that when a mother is married and living with her husband at
the time of conception, the husband is conclusively presumed
to be her child's father.1 With only a few narrow exceptions,
the conclusive presumption of paternity denies an unwed father the opportunity to establish his paternity because he is
precluded from offering evidence that the husband is not the
father.2
In a changing society, where divorce, remarriage, and
single parent homes are increasingly prevalent,3 the California
courts continue to struggle with the rights of the unwed father.
Until recently, most unwed fathers could only attack the pre1. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994). Section 7540 provides:

"Except as provided in Section 7541, the child of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage." [d.
2. A conclusive presumption bars all factual evidence to disprove the existence of the presumed fact. A conclusive presumption "[e]xists when an ultimate
fact is presumed to be true upon proof of another fact, and no evidence, no matter
how persuasive, can rebut it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 434 (6th ed. 1991).
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 79 tbl. 97, 80 tbl. 101 (114th ed. 1994). In 1991, 28 percent of births in
the nation and 33.3 percent of the births in California were to unwed mothers.
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sumption on constitutional grounds.' Two California Appellate
decisions have expanded the unwed father's right to challenge
the presumption of the husband's paternity.5 In these cases,
the two unwed fathers successfully rebutted the conclusive presumption of the husband's paternity by establishing their presumed father status under an exception to the California Family Code section 7540 enacted in 1990. 6 The courts in Comino
v. Kelly and Steven W. v. Matthew S. gave this rebuttable presumption more strength than the critics predicted, 7 allowing
the presumed father to prove his relationship without having
to mount a constitutional attack. 8
This comment begins with the history of the conclusive
presumption of paternity in California, from its common law
roots to its modern day affirmation in Michael H. v. Gerald D.9
This background will discuss the adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act in California and its application in paternity proceedings. lo In an effort to advocate the need for its repeal,

4. Before the statutory amendments of 1991, only the mother or her husband
could move the court to consider blood test evidence in defense of the conclusive
presumption of the husband's paternity.
California Evidence Code section 621 provided in pertinent part:
(c)
The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the husband not later than two
years from the child's date of birth.
(d)
The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the mother not later than two
years from the child's date of birth if the child's biological
father has flied an affidavit with the court acknowledging
paternity of the child.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c)-(d) (West 1990), aTTumded by Ch. 543, § 2, replaced by
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540(b)-(c) (West 1994).
5. Comino v. Kelly, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994); Steven W.
v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
6. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1990), amended by Ch. 543, § 2, replaced by
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994).
7. See Mindy S. Halpern, Comment, Father Knows Best . But Which Father?
California's Presumption of Legitimacy Loses its Conclusiveness: Michael H. v. Gerald D. and its Aftermath, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 305 (1991).
8. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731, 732; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538,
539. In both cases, the courts granted the unwed father paternity rather than
applying the conclusive presumption to the mother's husband. The courts applied
section 7611(d) reasoning that a man who has a substantially developed relationship with the child is the presumed father. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731, 732;
Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538, 539.
9. Michael H. v. Gerald. D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
10. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 295 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995).
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this comment will also discuss the modem trend in the California courts to circumvent the conclusive presumption.l1
The comment then argues that California Family Code
Section 7611(d)12, as a complement to section 7540, has proven a viable statutory inroad for unwed fathers seeking paternity as evidenced in Comino v. Kelly13 and Steven W. v. Matthew S.14 These two recent cases, along with section 7611(d),
broadened the definition of a presumed father and the class of
people who may contest the husband's paternity. Previously,
California courts employed a fact-based balancing test of the
private and state interests in particular familial relationships
when the conclusive presumption of section 7540 was under
constitutional attack. 15 Now, based on the rebuttable presumption found in section 7611(d), courts have given the established parent-child relationships of at least two unwed fathers
meaningful consideration when the husband or the child's
mother attempted to use the conclusive presumption as a defense to a paternity action by the natural father. IS
The comment concludes that this rebuttable presumption
enables an unwed father to establish his parental rights regardless of the mother's marital status. By protecting developed parent-child relationships, California law has become
more closely aligned with the Uniform Parentage Act, which
aims to eliminate any differentiation between a married and
an unmarried parent's legal relationship with the child. 17 The

11. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535; In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989); In re Guardianship of
Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. t. App. 1 Dist. 1990). See also Bonnie Baxt
Silber, How Irrebuttable is the Irrebuttable Presumption of Paternity in Section 621
of the California Evidence Code? An Examination of Michael H. v. Gerald D. and
Its Aftermath in California, 13 J. Juv. L. 159 (1992).
12. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994). Section 7611 states that a man
may be presumed to be a child's father if, among other things, "[h]e receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Id.
13. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994).
14. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
15. In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123 (1975).
16. See Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535.
17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 295, 296 (West 1987 and Supp.
1995). Section 2 provides:
"The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id.
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courts have demonstrated the dwindling usefulness of the
conclusive presumption in paternity disputes by placing greater importance on an assessment of the child's existing relationships.ls
II. BACKGROUND
The conclusive presumption of paternity was introduced at
common law in order to reduce instances of illegitimacy. The
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act in 1976 purportedly
dispensed with the legal distinction of children based on the
marital status of their parents. In California, however, the
statute did not allow children or unwed fathers to submit rebuttal evidence to challenge the presumption of the mother's
husband's paternity until 1990. Thus, almost fifteen years
after California adopted the UPA, it finally began to dismantle
the legal constructs which explicitly preferred the mother's
husband to the unwed father.
A. THE COMMON LAw AND ILLEGITIMACY

At common law, the presumption of a husband's paternity
was intended to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy and to promote marital peace and happiness. 19 A child born
out of wedlock was known as nullius filius, literally "no one's
son".20 An illegitimate child was denied virtually all legal
rights to inheritance. 21 The parents had no legal relationship
with the child, but were nonetheless obligated to support the
child. 22
18. See Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy; The Legacy
of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TuL. L. REV. 585, 636 (1991). On the inappropriateness of the presumption in paternity determinations, Professor Kisthardt stated:
"A conclusive marital presumption highlights form over substance and does not
take into account the relationships that may be 'familial' but which do not constitute a 'unitary family'." [d.
19. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 125 citing J. Schouler, LAw OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS § 225 at 306 (3d ed. 1882).
20. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458 (1803).
21. [d. "The rights [of the bastard] are very few, being only such as he can
acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody, and
sometimes called filius nullius, sometimes, filius populi.(footnotes omitted)" [d. at
*458-459.
22. Diane C. Wilson, The Uniform Parentage Act; What it Will Mean for the
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A child born to a married couple was presumed to be legitimate. 23 The presumption was intended to ensure that a child
born to a married woman was not denied legitimate status. 24
In some jurisdictions, the presumption of legitimacy could be
rebutted only by the mother or her husband. 25 Either party
would have to show that the husband did not have access to
the wife at the approximate time of conception. 26 According to
Lord Mansfield's rule, followed in other jurisdictions, neither
the mother nor her husband were even allowed to rebut the
presumption. 27
California codified the common law conclusive presumption of paternity in 1872, which stated that the child of a woman who was living with her husband at the time of conception
is conclusively presumed to be the husband's child. 28 Originally, the statute provided only two narrow exceptions to rebut
the conclusive presumption: a showing of impotencl9 or sterility.30
B. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT HAD LIMITED EFFECT ON
THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY

In the 1960's and 70's, the rights of unwed fathers and
children of unwed parents began to expand. 31 Many statutes
that discriminated against children of unwed parents were
ruled unconstitutiona1. 32 In 1975, because these decisions left

Putative Father in California. n 28 HAsT. L.J. 191, 192 (1976).
23. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *446.
24. HARRy D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAw AND SOCIAL POLICY 16-17 (1971).
25. Id. at 119.
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *457.
27. Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 589.
28. Wilson, supra note 22, at 199, 201.
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1954)(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE §
7540 (West 1994)).
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1976)(current version at CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7540 (West 1994».
31. Wilson, supra note 22, at 193.
32. Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6-8 (1974)
citing as examples Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(The Court held that children of unwed parents are entitled to workmen's compensation benefits related to the father's death.); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp.
588 (D. Conn. 1972) (The court enjoined a Social Security provision that favored
legitimate children when disbursing family awards.); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
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a "statutory void" in this area of the law, the Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter "UPA") was drafted. 33 The UPA eliminated the legal distinction between illegitimate and legitimate
children. 34
The UPA35 was created in order to give children equal
legal status regardless of their parents' marital status. 36 In
place of the legitimacy language, the UPA substituted the
"parent-child relationship," intending to shift the legal focus
from the parents' marital status to the child's familial relationships.3? California continued to prefer the married parent to
the single parent, however, by retaining the conclusive presumption of paternity after it adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act in 1976.
Although the unwed father could fall under one of the five
rebuttable presumptions used to establish fatherhood,38 he
still could not use that presumptive status to assert his paternity if the mother was married to and living with another
man. Not until 1990, after the United States Supreme Court
decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.39, did the California legislature expand the class of parties who could rebut the conclusive presumption to include an unwed, presumed father under
Family Code section 7611.40

645 (1972) (The Court struck down a statute as unconstitutional which denied an
unwed father a hearing on his fitness as a parent before removing his children
after the mother's death.).
33. Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. at 7 (1974);
Unif. Parentage Act, 9B U.LA 295 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995).
34. Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation: "Domestic Relations; Parent
and Child Relationship. n 7 PAC. L.J. 411 (1976).
35. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7750 (West 1994); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B
U.LA 295 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995).
36. Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation: "Domestic Relations; Parent
and child relationship. n 7 PAC. L.J. 411 (1976). "The major purpose of the UPA is
to provide for substantive legal equality of children regardless of the marital status of their parents." [d. at 411.
37. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. at 296. Section 2 provides:
"The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." [d. California's current version of this section is codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 1994).
38. CAL. CN. CODE § 7004(a) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611
(West 1994).
39. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1990), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540
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In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Supreme
Court upheld California's conclusive presumption of paternity.42 In Michael H., an unwed father attacked section 7540 on
due process grounds in an effort to maintain his relationship
with his biological daughter. 43 The Court held that in the interest of family integrity, when a mother is married to another
man, the unwed father cannot rebut the presumption that the
husband is the father.44 This approach failed to give weight to
whether the unwed father was the natural father or whether
he had a developed relationship with his child. 45
Carole D. and Gerald D. were married in 1976, later settling in southern California. 46 During the summer of 1978,
Carole D. began an extramarital affair with Michael H., and in
September 1980, Carole D. conceived a child. 47 Her husband,
Gerald D., was named as the father on the birth certificate,
and held the child out as his own.4B Mter the child's birth
however, Carole D. informed Michael H. that he was the
child's biological father. 49
In October 1981, several months after the child's birth, the
husband moved to New York, and Carole D. remained in California. 50 During this period of separation, Carole D. and the
child spent time with Michael H., the natural father, who held
(West 1994).
41. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1987), 485
U.S. 903, cert. granted, (U.S. Feb. 29, 1988)(No. 87-746), affd, 491 U.S. 110
(1989)(5-4 decision)(Scalia, J. wrote the plurality opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J.
joined; O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ. joined the plurality opinion in part; Stevens, J.
concurred in the judgment; and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White, JJ.
dissented).
42. ld. at 110.
43. ld. at 129.
44. ld. at 120.
45. ld. at 121, 127.
46. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
47. ld. at 113.
48. ld. at 113-14.
49. ld. at 114. The blood test results determined natural father's paternity
with a 98.07% probability. ld.
50. ld.
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the child out as his own. 51 From January to March 1982, the
threesome lived together until the mother moved in with a
third man, during which time she continued to visit her husband in New York. 52
In November 1982, when the mother refused to allow the
natural father to visit the child, the father filed a filiation
action in California Superior Court in order to establish his
paternity and to obtain visitation rights. 53 While contesting
this action in the spring of 1983, the mother returned to her
husband in New York. 54
At the end of the summer of 1983, Carole D. reconciled
with Michael H. and dropped her summary judgment motion. 55 For the next eight months, Michael H. again lived with
Carole D. and their daughter in a family arrangement. 56 In
April 1984, the mother and Michael H. drew up a stipulation
to his paternity. 57 Then, in June 1984, the mother reconciled
once again with her husband, and ordered her attorneys not to
file the stipulation. 58
In October of 1984, the husband intervened in the suit,
and filed a summary judgment motion asserting the conclusive
presumption of his paternity.59 The trial court found that the
mother and her husband were married and cohabiting at the
time of the child's conception. 60 Under section 7540, the elements of the presumption were fulfilled, and the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the husband's presumed paternity.61

51. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.

52. [d.
53. [d. A filiation action is defined as "[a] special statutory proceeding in the
nature of a civil action to enforce a civil obligation or duty specifically for the
purpose of establishing parentage and the putative father's duty to support his
illegitimate child." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 434 (6th ed. 1991).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
57. Id.
58. [d. at 115.
59. [d.
60. [d. The court relied on affidavits attesting that husband and mother were
cohabiting at conception and that husband is neither impotent nor sterile. Id.
61. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115.
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Having been denied standing to rebut the application of
the conclusive presumption of the husband's paternity, on
appeal the natural father argued that the conclusive presumption violated both his procedural and substantive due process
rights under the United States Constitution,62 and was therefore unconstitutiona1. 63 The California Court of Appeal rejected the due process arguments and affirmed the lower court's
decision to apply the conclusive presumption. 64 The California
Supreme Court denied discretionary review,65 but the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of the
conclusive presumption's constitutionality.66
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia,67 the
Court denied constitutional protection to the relationship between the unwed father and his daughter. 68 The plurality focused primarily on the substantive due process argument. 69
The natural father asserted that the integrity of the mother's
marriage was not a sufficient state interest to support termination of his relationship with his child. 70 The plurality responded that the success of such an argument required that the
relationship be a traditionally constitutionally protected liberty
interest. 71 The Court refused to expand the definition of the
unitary family to include the mother's lover because such a
relationship does not fit the mold of "traditionally respected
relationships" for purposes of constitutional protection.72 With

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XN, § 1.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116.
236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1987).
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116.
[d. at 110.

67. [d.
68. [d. at 113.

69.
70.
71.
72.

[d. at 121.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121.
[d.
[d. at 123 n.3.
The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is
typified, of course, by the marital family . . . Perhaps, it
can be expanded beyond this, but it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships - and will
thus cease to have any constitutional significance - if it is
stretched so far as to include the relationship established
between a married woman, her lover, and their child.

[d.
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continued deference to the California legislature,73 and adherence to a strict reading of the Constitution,74 the Court refused to recognize an unwed father's liberty interest in his
parental relationships when it conflicted with an established
marital family unit. 75
The Court defended the statute on policy grounds. 76
Throughout the opinion, it maintained that the primary policy
consideration underlying the conclusive presumption was the
integrity of the marital family.77 The Court assumed for purposes of this argument that this family unit, by virtue of the
sanctity of the unitary family arrangement, was a solid and
nurturing one. 7S In doing so, the Court ignored the inconsistent and unstable nature of the mother's three relationships
over the first three years of the child's life. 79 Because the couple had decided to raise the child, the Court invoked society's
preference for the traditional family unit, as it is manifested in
the statute. so So, rather than assess the importance of the
child's relationship with her father, the Court relied on traditional notions of the nuclear family to terminate the natural
father's established relationship with the child. sl
In response to this argument, the natural father argued
that a prior line of Supreme Court cases granted him a liberty

73. Id. at 122 citing to Justice White's dissent in Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 544 (1977).
74. Id. at 122 citing again to Justice White's dissent in Moore, 431 U.S. at
544.
75. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 129-130.
76. ld. at 129-130.
77. Id. at 120. "Of course the conclusive presumption not only expresses the
state's substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child's
paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy." Id.
78. Id. at 123. This characterization of this family directly contradicts Justice
Scalia's prior reference to the child's various living arrangements as "quasifamily
units". Id. at 114.
79. Id. at 113, 114.
80. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 129 n.7 . "That tradition [to prefer the unitary
family to the unwed father] reflects a 'balancing' that has already been made by
society itself." Id.
81. See Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 633 (1991). Professor Kisthardt stated:
"The plurality bases much of its decision on the value of protecting the 'morally
correct' intact family. The Court refers to legislative intent and public policy, but
in a manner that limits the discussion to a narrow view of the type of family that
is morally acceptable to the current Court." Id.
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interest in his established parental relationships.82 By narrowly defining the interest at stake as that of an "adulterous
natural father," the Court concluded that historically the natural father had never been afforded constitutional protection in
such circumstances. 83 The Court distinguished the prior cases
because there was no existing family unit at stake. 84 The
Court further held that, though some jurisdictions had granted
biological fathers standing, there were no cases in which the
natural father had been given full parental or substantive
rights in the face of an existing family unit. 85 The Court held
that there is no justification for the natural father's liberty
interest due to the lack of precedent protecting the unwed
father in these circumstances,86 coupled with society's traditional views toward the marital institution. 87
Finally, the Court concluded that even if the natural father had established a relationship with the child which placed
him on equal footing with the husband,88 society's views toward marriage, as reflected in the legislation itself, tipped the
balance in the husband's favor. 89 The Court refused to establish rights of dual fatherhood. 90 According to the Court, the

82. Michael H., 491 u.s. at 123. For United States Supreme Court cases
which have recognized rights of the unwed father based on an established parentchild relationship see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
83. [d. at 129 n.7.
84. [d. at 123. "As we view [these cases], they rest not upon such isolated
factors but upon the historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a
term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary
family." Id. But cf. [d. at 157-158 wherein Justice White states: "Prior cases here
have recognized the liberty interest of a father in his relationship with his child."
85. [d. at 127.
86. [d. at 125.
87. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to
whether the relationship between persons in the situation
of the natural father and his child has been treated as a
protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special protection.
[d.
88. See supra note 78.
89. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119.
90. [d. at 118. Justice Scalia relied on the observation that California law does
not provide for dual fatherhood.
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natural father's opportunity to develop the parental relationship conflicted with the husband's opportunity to do the
same. 91 Therefore, because the court considered marriage a
priority, the husband's opportunity preempted the unwed
father's relationship.92 Despite the questionable stability of
the marriage itself, the plurality protected the ideal of the
unitary family at the expense of the established relationship
between the unwed father and the child.
In dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan and White took
issue with the plurality's assertion that unwed fathers do not
have a constitutionally protected interest when the mother is
married to someone else. 93 Essentially, the plurality ruled
that the unwed father has no rights in such circumstances
because the state has an interest in protecting the integrity of
the family unit. 94
Justice Brennan contended that the plurality's reliance on
tradition as a source of protected liberty interests provided less
guidance in practice than the plurality claimed. 95 He argued
that California's conclusive presumption of paternity was originally intended to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy when accurate determination of biological paternity was
impossible. 96 With the advent of blood tests and DNA matching, the only remaining justification for the presumption would

91. [d. at 129. "Where, however, the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the
State to give categorical preference to the latter." [d.
92. [d.
93. [d. at 136, 157.

94. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 154.
95. [d. at 137. "Because reasonable people can disagree about the content of
particular traditions, and because they can disagree even about which traditions
are relevant to the definition of 'liberty', the plurality has not found the objective
boundary that it seeks." [d.
96. [d. at 140.
In the plurality's constitutional universe, we may not take
notice of the fact that the original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place in a world
in which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow
of a doubt who sired a particular child and in which the
fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and
stigmatizing role it once did.
[d.
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be the state's interest in the family unit. 97 The dissenters argued that the plurality erroneously allowed the state's interest
to determine the existence of the liberty interest in question
and adamantly disputed the plurality's narrow focus on
society's traditional reverence for the marital family.98
Both Justices Brennan and White pointed out that had the
Court taken a similar traditional tack in a line of its prior
relevant cases, those decisions would have had drastically
different results. 99 They also asserted that an unwed father's
interest in his substantial parent-child relationship is not a
newly recognized interest and that the plurality was mistaken
in this regard. 100
The plurality opinion was widely criticized 101 as a departure from that line of Supreme Court cases 102 which expanded the unwed father's rights on both Due Process and Equal

97. Id.
98. Id. at 145.
99. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 139, 157.
100. Id. at 142-43, 157. Justice Brennan stated:
On four prior occasions, we have considered whether unwed fathers have a constitutionally protected interest in
their relationships with their children. See Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397
(1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). Though
different in factual and legal circumstances, these cases
have produced a unifying theme: although an unwed
father's biological link to his child does not, in and of
itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so.
Id. at 142-43.
101. E.g. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 135 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 157
(White, J., dissenting); Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 585; Joan C. Sylvain, Note,
Michael B. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 831
(1990); Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1988); Jill Handley Anderson, The Functioning Father: A Unified Approach to Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847
(1991); Elizabeth A. Hadad, Comment, Tradition and the Liberty Interest: Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father: Michael B. v. Gerald D. 56 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 291 (1990).
102. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983).
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Protection grounds. 103 These critics argued that earlier cases
recognized the importance of the established parent-child relationship when determining paternity. They also noted that the
plurality's reliance on the notion of the unitary family ignored
the realities of most modern American family circumstances. 1M

D. THE RESPONSE To MICHAEL H. V. GERALD D.: THE 1990
AMENDMENT To THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION - FAMILY
CODE SECTION 7611(D)
Mter Michael H., 105 the California Legislature amended
the conclusive presumption of section 7540 to allow the presumed father and the child to rebut the presumption with
blood test evidence. lOG Under this section, a man is presumed
to be a child's father if he fulfills the criteria of one of the five
rebuttable presumptions adopted from the Uniform Parentage
Act,to7 known in California as Family Code section 7611.108

103.
104.
105.
106.
part:

U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 627.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 1994). Section 7541 provides in relevant
(a) Notwithstanding Section 7540, if the court finds
that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the
evidence based on blood tests performed pursuant to
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7550), are that the
husband is not the father of the child, the question of
paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly.
(b) The notice of motion for blood tests under this
section may be filed not later than two years from the
child's date of birth by the husband, or for the purposes
of establishing paternity by the presumed father or the
child through or by the child's guardian ad litem. AI:, used
in this subdivision, "presumed father" has the meaning
given in Sections 7611 and 7612.

Id.
107. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a), 9B U.LA 295, 298-99 (West 1987).
108. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 and Supp. 1996). Section 7611 provides:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a
child if he meets the conditions provided in Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 7540) or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2 or in any of the following subdivisions:
(a) He and the child's natural mother are or have
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Relevant here are the presumptions which provide that a man
is presumed to be the child's father under this section if he and
the mother are married at the time of birth; if the child is born
within 300 days of the termination of the marriage; if the couple has attempted to marry before or after the child's birth; or
if the man receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his own. 109 California courts have also placed
natural fathers and husbands on equal footing under these
rebuttable presumptions in order to assess the family circumstances, without being bound by the conclusive presump-

been married to each other and the child is born during
the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity,
or divorce, or after a judgment of separation is entered by
a court.
(b) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted to marry each other by a
marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law,
although the attempted marriage is or could be declared
invalid, and either of the following is true:
(1) If the attempted marriage could be declared
invalid only by a court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce.
(2) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a
court order the child is born within 300 days after the
termination of cohabitation.
(c) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural
mother have married, or attempted to marry, each other
by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with
law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and either of the following is true:
(1) With his consent, he is named as the child's
father on the child's birth certificate.
(2) He is obligated to support the child under a
written voluntary promise or by court order.
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child.
(e) If the child was born and resides in a nation
with which the United States engages in an Orderly Departure Program or successor program, he acknowledges
that he is the child's father in a declaration under penalty of peIjury, as specified in Section 2015.5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. This subdivision shall remain in effect
only until January 1, 1997, and on that date shall become
inoperative.
[d.

109. [d.
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tion. llO This expansion boded well for unwed fathers who had
an established relationship with the child whose mother was
married to another man. III
Given its vague language and limited applicability, section
7611(d), which states that a man is presumed to be a child's
father if he receives the child into his home, was criticized as
an inadequate remedy for the unwed father's dwindling legal
status. 1l2 Prior to this statutory revision however, only the
mother or her husband were permitted to admit rebuttal evidence, 113 and unwed fathers were limited to attacking the
constitutionality of the statute.1l4 Now, the unwed father
may establish himself as a presumed father under section
7611(d).1l5 He may then directly dispute the conclusive presumption as an acknowledged, interested party by demonstrating that he has "openly held the child out as his own and has
received the child into his home.,,1l6 This revision reflects the
reasoning of the earlier Supreme Court holdings that a father
and child have a constitutionally protected interest in protecting and maintaining their relationship.ll7

110. See supra part N.B for relevant discussion of Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39
Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (1995).
111. These rebuttable presumptions previously pertained to unwed fathers who
wanted to stay adoption proceedings. In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216
(1992). A father who wants the right to consent to his child's adoption first must
establish his status as a presumed father under one the five presumptions. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 7017 (1990), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7660 (West 1994).
This amendment is likely due in large part to the lobbying efforts of Michael H. after Justice Scalia took his daughter away. Marcia Coyle, After the Gavel Comes Down, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 25, 1991, at l.
112. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 305. Halpern contends that the definition of
a "presumed father" under this subsection subjects the father to the "whims of the
child's mother". Arguably, the mother may intentionally prevent the father from
seeing the child and in that way keep the father from meeting any relationship
standard. Id. at 307.
113. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1981)(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE §
7540 (West 1994».
114. E.g., In re Lisa R. 532 P.2d 123 (1975); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703
P.2d 88 (1985); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
115. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 1994);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 and Supp. 1996).
116. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994 and Supp. 1996).
117. See Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 621. Professor Kisthardt, commenting on
Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H., stated: "Focusing on the relationship
between Michael and Victoria, he [Brennan] concluded that previous Court holdings are clear; a biological link plus an established relationship gives rise to a
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III. POST-MICHAEL H. CALIFORNIA CASE LAW:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE UNWED FATHERCHILD RELATIONSHIP BEFORE THE 1990
AMENDMENT

Within a year after the United States Supreme Court
decided Michael H. v. Gerald D., 118 two California Courts of
Appeal refused to apply the conclusive presumption of paternity.119 Though the Michael H. Court had just upheld the constitutionality of the presumption, these two courts granted
paternity to the natural father. Because the statute did not
provide any meaningful exceptions to the conclusive presumption and the Legislature had yet to amend the UPA, the courts
devised ways around it in order to grant paternity to the man
with the established relationship.120 The court decided In re
Guardianship of Ethan S. based on the doctrine of equitable
estoppel,121 while the court in In re Melissa G. refused to apply the presumption on constitutional grounds. 122 Such case
law laid the foundation for statutory change in favor of the
unwed father who has a relationship with his child despite the
mother's marriage to another man.
A. IN RE MELISSA G. 123

In In re Melissa G., a married woman gave birth to Melissa, whom she conceived with a man who was not her husband. 124 Eight days after the birth, the married couple separated. 125 The husband was named as the father on the birth
certificate, and the child was named as a child of the marriage
at dissolution. 126 After the dissolution, the ex-husband visited

protected liberty interest." Id. at 621.
118. 490 U.S. 110 (1989).
119. In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989); In re
Guardianship of Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990).
120. See supra notes 121-22.
121. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
122. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
123. In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989).
124. Id. at 895.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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the other children of the marriage but not Melissa. 127
For four years, the mother was married to the natural
father with whom she and the children lived as a family and
during that time had another child with him.12s When the
mother was hospitalized for alcohol abuse and the child's natural father was arrested for spousal abuse, the children were
taken into protective custody. 129 The older children of the
first marriage were placed with their father, the ex-husband. 130 Melissa and a younger child of the second marriage
were placed together in a foster home. 131
The ex-husband of the mother's first marriage sought to
assert the conclusive presumption of his paternity in order to
obtain custody of Melissa. 132 The trial court disregarded the
blood tests that confirmed the second husband's biological
fatherhood, 133 and ruled in favor of the ex-husband. 134 The
court found a conclusive presumption under section 7540 and
held that the first husband was the child's father as a matter
of law. 135
The California Court of Appeal overturned the trial court's
application of the presumption of paternity.13G The court relied in part on Michael H., which recognized a natural father's
constitutionally protected interest in a situation where no
marital union existed at the time of disposition.1 37 Here, be127. [d.
128. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
129. [d.
130. [d.
13l. [d.
132. [d.
133. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895. The blood test results showed 99.1 percent probability that the second husband was the child's father. [d.
134. [d. The first husband contended that application of the conclusive presumption precluded consideration of rebuttal evidence such as the blood test results. [d.
135. [d. The trial court based its reasoning on Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703
P.2d 88 (1985), and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), finding that
because the mother and husband were married and cohabiting at the time of conception, they were presumptively the parents of the child. [d.
136. [d. at 898. The Court of Appeal found that the underlying purpose of the
statute would not be served by depriving the child of her relationship with her
sister in order to place her with a father she with whom she has no relationship.
[d.
137. [d. at 897. "The Supreme Court's affirmance in Michael H. was limited to
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cause the initial family unit no longer existed and only lasted
eight days after the child's conception, the state had no interest in protecting it.138 The Melissa G. court also found that
the first husband had not established any substantial relationship with the child. 139 Societal interests were better served
because the natural father had assumed the primary paternal
role for the four years of the child's life. 140
By focusing on a prior line of similar cases preceding Michael H., the Melissa G. court found that precedent protected
fathers who had actively established substantial relationships
with their children and voluntarily provided emotional and
financial support. 141 The Melissa G. court applied the holdings which emphasized the importance of protecting and encouraging substantial relationships whether it be the
husband's or the unwed father's relationship.142
The Melissa G. court employed a balancing of interests to
decide whether to remove the child from the foster home where
she was placed with her closest family relation, her sister.143
Because there was no marital union to protect and both established familial relationships were outside the non-existent
marriage, the facts weighed against applying the conclusive
presumption. 144 The Melissa G. court held that the state and
private interests in protecting the child's relationships con-

situations in which the husband and wife wish to raise the wife's child jointly;
Justice Scalia explicitly left open the possibility that a constitutionally protected
interest might be implicated where no such union exists. (citation omitted)" Id.
See, Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 n.7.
138. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898. The court compared the extant marriage
in Michael H. with this case where the marriage dissolved eight days after the
child's birth and concluded: "[t]he 'categorical preference' for an extant marital
union which Justice Scalia recognized as being expressed by the statute thus has
no application to this case." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 895-97. The court compared the facts of the case at bar to the following contextually similar cases: In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123 (1975); Estate of
Cornelius, 674 P.2d 245 (1984); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88 (1985);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989).
142. 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
143. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 896, relying on In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123
(1975).
144. Id. at 898.
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trolled. 145 The underlying purpose of the presumption would
not be served by presuming the first husband to be the father,
even though the older children already lived with him and the
natural father was in prison, because that would deprive the
child of her most substantial relationship.l46
The Melissa G. court looked beyond the mother's marriage
at the time of conception, and gave more weight to the established parent-child relationship between Melissa and her natural father. 147 The court refused to create family relationships
for abstract legal purposes,l48 though it had protected parties'
private interests in preserving established family relationships.149 As unwed fathers in California fought against the
conclusive presumption of the husband's paternity for their
parental rights, Melissa G. was a step toward satisfaction for
those fathers who have a relationship warranting special protection from the law.
B. IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF ETHAN S.150

In In re Ethan S., the mother conceived her child during a
weekend extramarital encounter.l5l Wayne, the natural father was always known by the child to be the father;152 the
child called him "dad" and called his mother's husband by his
first name. 153 When the mother divorced her husband, she
moved to Australia and left the child in California. 154 The
child lived with the ex-husband, during which time Wayne

145. [d.
146. [d.
147. [d. at 898. The court found a way around the presumption using the Michael H. opinion, which stated that the classification and the policy it serves must
fit in order to apply the presumption. [d.
148. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held the view that "[pjarental rights do not spring
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require
relationships more enduring." [d.
149. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
150. 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990).
151. [d. at 123.
152. [d.
153. [d.
154. [d.
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maintained consistent contact, and the ex-husband represented
that Wayne was the child's father. 155
Four years later, the child moved in with Wayne, the natural father, attended elementary school, and began to develop a
strong bond with Wayne and the paternal grandparents. 156
During this time, Wayne established himself as the child's
legal guardian. 157 After the ex-husband attempted to abduct
the child from his classroom, the natural father sought sole
custody of the child. 15s In his answer to the natural father's
custody action, the ex-husband asserted the conclusive presumption of his own paternity on the grounds that he and the
child's mother were married and cohabiting at the time of the
child's conception. 159 Upon a recommendation from the child's
psychotherapist, 160 the lower court denied the ex-husband
any parental rights and granted the natural father and the
grandparents joint custody.161
The California Court of Appeal refused to apply the conclusive presumption of section 7540 and affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the natural father. 162
Rather than decide the case on constitutional grounds, the
Ethan S. court based its decision on equitable estoppel. 163 It
held that because the ex-husband permitted and encouraged
the natural father to establish a relationship with the child
and neglected to do so himself in any meaningful way, he was

155. Ethan S.,· 271 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
156. [d. at 124.
157. [d.
158. [d.
159. [d.
160. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 125. Ethan's psychotherapist found that he had
formed strong bonds both with his natural father and his grandparents. He did
not believe that his mother's ex-husband was his father and resented that the exhusband's attempts to intrude on his life with his father's family. [d.
161. [d. at 125, 126. The court concluded that the child's best interests would
be served with fewer disruptions in his home life. [d. at 125.
162. [d. at 129.
163. [d. California Evidence Code section 623 states: "Whenever a party has,
by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it." [d.
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estopped from asserting rights under the conclusive presumption of section 7540. 164
During the time that the child lived with the natural father, he formed substantial bonds with the natural father and
his parents. 165 The child understood that the natural father
was his true father and that his half siblings were the exhusband's children. 166 The ex-husband had never asserted his
paternity and had expressly acquiesced to the natural father's
paternity.167 The ex-husband told the child that the natural
father was his father, and so, he was estopped from claiming
otherwise. 16B
By estopping the husband from asserting his paternity, the
Ethan S. court effectively protected the existing father-child
relationship, making certain that the child's life would not be
disrupted any further. The Ethan S. court recognized that
preserving the developed parent-child relationship was best for
the child and paramount to any outside claims. 169 In order to
fulfill the underlying purpose of the conclusive presumption,
the Ethan S. court refused to apply section 7540. 170 This decision represents a continuing trend in the California courts to
set aside the conclusive presumption of paternity when enforcing the presumption displaces a child's established relationship
with her father.17l

164. [d. at 129.
165. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130. The court states: "Ethan relied on that
representation, building a life-long relationship with Wayne [the natural father) as
his natural father and living with Wayne on that understanding, developing parent-like attachments with the 'grandparents' who stepped in when the ailing
Wayne tragically died." [d.
166. [d.
167. [d. "[W)e see no reason why estoppel should not apply in the more unusual case, as here, where the man tells the child he is not the father and that another man is." [d.
168. [d.
169. [d.
170. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130. "In this case, there is no policy risk that
applying the doctrine [of estoppel) will leave the child fatherless or unsupported.
Also, if we view the cases cited above as justified by the policy of preserving existing father-child relationships, the same policy is served by an estoppel here." [d.
171. See supra parts III-IV for complete discussion.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/4

22

Smernoff: Presumption of Paternity

1996]

PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY

359

IV. CALIFORNIA CASE LAW SINCE THE 1990
AMENDMENT: THE UNWED FATHER'S
OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE CONCLUSIVE
PRESUMPTION OF THE HUSBAND'S PATERNITY
Two recent California Court of Appeal decisions, Comino v.
Kelly 172 and Steven W. v. Matthew S.,173 represent a significant change in the unwed father's ability to challenge the conclusive presumption of paternity. These courts granted the
unwed fathers paternity not because application of the statute
under certain conditions was unconstitutional, but because the
newly-enacted father-child relationship exception to section
7540 allows the unwed father to challenge the husband directly.174 Once the unwed father was able to demonstrate that he
indeed had a meaningful relationship with the child, the courts
did not automatically favor the husband. 175 Rather, the courts
treated the husband's presumed paternity as a rebuttable
presumption, placing the unwed father on comparable footing.176 In effect, the father-child relationship, rather than the
marital situation of the mother, became the primary factor in
the paternity determination.
A. COMINO V. KELLy177

In Comino v. Kelly, the mother and an acquaintance married in order to take advantage of military benefits which were
only available to married couples. 178 Aside from their marital
status, the two were essentially roommates and never engaged
in any sexual relations. 179 During the marriage, the mother
had a sexual relationship with another man, Paul, and became
pregnant. 180 The mother then moved in with Paul, and for
two and a half years Paul assumed the role of the child's fa-

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

30
39
30
[d.
[d.
30
[d.
[d.
[d.

Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1994).
Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728; 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535.

Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1994).
at 729.
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ther.18l When the mother moved back in with her husband
and threatened to restrict Paul's visitation, Paul initiated a
paternity action to establish his custodial rights. 182 He was
granted temporary joint legal and physical custody, with physical custody 50 percent of the time. 183
On appeal, the mother attempted to prevent the father
from seeing his child by arguing that the court erred in not
applying the conclusive presumption of paternity in favor of
her husband. l84 She maintained that she and her husband
were cohabiting at the time of conception and therefore, pursuant to section 7540, her husband was the presumed father.185
She also argued that Paul was estopped from establishing his
paternity because "he failed to carry his burden of establishing
a biological link with [the child].,,186 The husband joined the
paternity suit, however, to deny any relationship with the
child, legal or otherwise, and thus, clarified that the natural
father was the appropriate choice. 187
1. The Conclusive Presumption Of The Husband's Paternity
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
refusal to apply the conclusive presumption of paternity to a
situation where the marriage was "one in name only, ...
[where the child] never lived in a family unit with [his mother
and her husband],,,188 and where the unwed father held out
the child as his own and received the child into his home for
the child's entire life. 189
The Comino court relied on an earlier California case 190
which held that the courts "have refused to apply [the conclu-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
1993).

[d. at 730.
Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
[d. at 731.
[d.
County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist.
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sive presumption of former section 621] when the underlying
policies are not furthered."191 When deciding whether or not
to apply the conclusive presumption, the Comino court held
that the underlying purposes of the presumption 192 would not
be furthered if the presumption were applied in this case. 193
First, the marriage was one of convenience and was therefore not deserving of the protection afforded by the pre sumption. 194 There was no family unit to preserve and the integrity of the marriage was not jeopardized. 195 Second, the societal
interest in the child having a father was furthered by the natural, active father having custody.196 The husband showed no
interest in taking that role, and in fact denied his paternity in
his answer to the natural father's complaint. 197 Third, the
state's interest in securing an individual source of child support was satisfied by granting custody to the natural father
who was fighting to take on parental responsibilities. 19B Private and state interests in protecting the child's welfare and
financial well-being were satisfied by the unwed father, who
voluntarily assumed a very active role in raising the child. 199
In Comino, the marriage resembled a business arrangement more than an intimate relationship.20o To favor this
marriage over the father-child relationship would "[lead] to an
absurd result that defies reason and common sense. To apply
the [presumption] is to rely upon a fiction to establish a legal
fact which we know to be untrue, in order to protect policies
which in this case do not exist."201

191. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
192. [d. at 731. The court relied on Leslie B. which delineated the established
policies underlying the presumption as follows: ''Traditionally, it was stated that
the presumption was designed [1] to preserve the integrity of the family unit, [2]
protect children from the legal and social stigma of illegitimacy, and [3] promote
individual rather than state responsibility for child support." Id.
193. Id. at 731.
194. Id. at 729, 731.
195. Id. at 731.
196. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729.
201. [d.
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2. The Presumption Of The Unwed Father's Paternity
In the second part of the holding, the Comino court further
held that the natural father was the presumed father under
Family Code section 7611(d),202 which provides that a man
who receives the child into his home and openly holds the child
out as his own is presumed to be the child's father.203 This
decision marked the first time that a California court employed
this rebuttable presumption since the change in the statutory
language of the conclusive presumption. 204 Now, without
mounting a constitutional attack, this father could obtain legal
rights to his relationship with his child.

Upon examination of the nature, length, and quality of the
father-child relationship, the Comino court determined that
the relationship was substantial enough to qualify the father
as a presumed father. 205 The Comino court found that the
natural father deserved recognition because he had assumed
an active and caring paternal role in the child's life for three
years. 206 This represents a significant advance from Michael
H., where the Court denied an unwed father, who had a similarly substantial relationship, any constitutional protection
when the mother was married to and living with another
man. 207
In Comino, despite the mother's assertion of the conclusive
presumption, the unwed father had a right as the presumed
father to fight for obtaining parental rights. 208 The Comino
court recognized and validated the unwed father-child relationship.209 This decision laid the groundwork, using Family Code

202. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611
(West 1994).
203. [d.
204. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
205. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732.
206. [d. "[T]here was uncontradicted evidence that [the natural father] received
[the child] into his home, lived with him, held him out as his own and supported
him for nearly two-and-a-half years." [d.
207. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117.
208. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. The court upheld the trial court's order
that Comino "pay child support to Stephanie, and continued joint legal and physical custody." [d.
209. [d. at 731. ''To the extent there is a recognizable societal concern for Josh-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/4

26

Smernoff: Presumption of Paternity

1996]

PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY

363

section 7611(d), for any future unwed father who must challenge the conclusive presumption of paternity in order to preserve his father-child relationship.210
B. STEVEN W.

v.

MATHEW S.211

In Steven W. v. Matthew S., Steven W., the mother's boyfriend was led to believe that the child was his, and held the
child out as his own for three years.212 While they were living
together, the mother told Steven W. that she had divorced her
husband, Matthew S.213 Before they obtained a divorce, the
mother and her husband conceived a child while away on a
clandestine weekend trip.214 For three years, the mother and
Steven W. raised the child as a child of their relationship.215
Steven W. was named as the father on school records and the
birth certificate, and the child was given his surname. 216
When Steven W. discovered that the mother had deceived him
about her marital situation, he moved out and initiated a paternity suit.217
The lower court refused to apply section 7540 even though
the mother's boyfriend was asserting paternity, and was neither the biological father nor the mother's husband. 218 Instead, the lower court found that both men were presumed
fathers of the child; the husband under former Evidence Code
section 621,219 and Steven W. under former Civil Code section
7004(a)( 4). 220
ua to have a father, that concern is served by avoiding the presumption that
would prevent Joshua from enjoying a parental relationship with the only man he
has ever known as a father." Id.
210. See discussion supra part IV.B regarding Steven w. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
211. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
212. Id. at 539.
213. Id. at 536.
214. Id.
215. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536-37. The unwed father and the mother
bought a home, lived together and cared for the child. The unwed father was
directly involved with the child's care. Id.
216. Id. at 537.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 539.
219. Id. at 538; CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (1990), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE §
7540 (West 1994).
220. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (1992),
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1. The Conclusive Presumption Of The Husband's Paternity
On appeal, the Steven W. court held that the trial court's
application of the conclusive presumption was based on an
overly broad interpretation of the element of cohabiting. 221 In
California, cohabiting is strictly defined: "And by cohabitation
is not meant simply the gratification of the sexual passion, but
to live or dwell together, to have the same habitation, so that
where one lives and dwells there does the other live and dwell
also.,,222 The Steven W. court ruled that the mother's weekend
tryst with her husband failed to fulfill this element of the presumption, and held that the trial court erred in applying the
conclusive presumption on this basis. 223
2. The Presumption Of The Unwed Father's Paternity
Under California Civil Code section 7004(a)(4),224 Stephen was presumed to be the child's father because he had
received the child into his home and openly held out the child
as his own,225 and the husband was also presumed to be the
child's father under 7004(a)(1).226 The Steven W. court upheld
the lower court's decision that Steven W.'s established relationship was controllin!f27 regardless of the husband's presumptive status under the conclusive presumption. 228
California Family Code section 7612 provides that, when a
conflict arises between the presumption of the husband's pater-

replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994).
221. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538.
222. [d. at 538 quoting Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657 (1960).
223. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (1992),
replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994).
224. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(l) (1992),
replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 1994).
225. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611
(West 1994).
227. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(b) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612
(West 1994). Section 7004(b) provided in pertinent part: "If two or more presumptions arise under Section 7611 which conflict with each other, the presumption
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic
controls." [d.
228. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
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nity and the presumption of another man's paternity, "the
presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier
consideration of policy and logic controls."229 The court looked
to the established relationship as the deciding factor.23o Steven assumed the role of the child's father from the child's
birth; he cared for the child and participated in important
decision making regarding the child's health, education, and
care, and was known to others as the child's father. 231
Steven's level of parental involvement was sharply contrasted
with the mother's husband, who did not see the child until the
child was almost three months old. 232 Steven continued to
share custody and support responsibilities after he moved out
and the mother was living with her husband. 233 A man who
asserts his parental rights and assumes those responsibilities
is deemed a more deserving parent regardless of the couple's
marital status. 234
This holding validated the trial court's finding that the
more developed relationship was the critical consideration and
that this relationship controlled over the husband's legal status
as a presumed father under section 7540. 235 The unwed father was not the biological father, nor was he the mother's
husband, yet the court granted him parental rights. 236 Here,
the Steven W. court expanded the application of this rebuttable

229. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(b) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612
(West 1994).
230. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539. The court cited many cases in which
the courts upheld the existing parent-child relationships on the grounds that:
"[t]he state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parentchild . . . relationships which give young children social and emotional strength
and stability.'" (citation omitted) [d. See, e.g., Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr.
2d 120 (1994); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88 (1985); Comino v. Kelly, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (1994).
231. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
232. [d. at 537.
233. [d.
234. [d.; See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). The Lehr Court
held that: "[if the father] grasps the opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development."
[d. at 262.
235. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538-39.
236. [d.
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presumption to a new level, because, unlike Comino, this marriage was authentic. 237
The Steven W. court concluded that "[g]iven the strong
social policy in favor of preserving the on-going father-child
relationship, the trial court did not err in finding that the
conflict between the presumptions weighed in favor of Steven.,,238 The Steven W. court allowed the unwed father's presumption of paternity to preempt the presumption of the
husband's paternity due to the weight attributed to the parentchild relationship while balancing competing interests. 239
The Steven W. court narrowly construed the conclusive
presumption while giving the father-child relationship greater
weight when employing the section 7611(d) exception. 240 In
the future, men with developed parental relationships may be
protected more often when their interests conflict with the
mother's husband's interest in that relationship. AB evidenced
by these cases, the competing rebuttable presumptions protect
the stability of a child's surroundings more effectively than the
conclusive presumption in that they consider the relationship
between the parent and the child instead of the relationship
between the parents. In contrast, section 7540 is based solely
on the relationship between the parents. Thus, the applicability of section 7540 has been undermined so as to render it virtually ineffective. Therefore, it should be repealed.

V. RECOMMENDATION
Critics of the conclusive presumption of paternity argue
that it jeopardizes a child's need for continuity in her parental
relationships.241 Studies show that because a child grows attached to her parents at a very young age, if deprived of that

237. Id. at 536.
238. Id.
239. Id. "The courts have repeatedly held, in applying paternity presumptions,
that the extant parent-child relationship is to be preserved at the cost of biological
ties. Id.
240. See supra notes 210-39 and accompanying discussion.
241. See Jill Handley Anderson, The Functioning Father: A Unified Approach to
Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847, 863 (1991); Kisthardt, supra note 18,
at 585.
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relationship, the child is likely to experience problems in her
emotional and intellectual development. 242 Familial relationships in these paternity determinations are of paramount importance, therefore the parents' marital status should be given
less weight. 243 Unlike the conclusive presumption, a legal
concept of "family" centered around the established parentchild relationship would accommodate contemporary, alternative familial circumstances,244 and more effectively stabilize
the child's home environment and her guardian relationships
in the tumultuous setting of a custody dispute.
Both Comino v. Kelly and Steven W. v. Matthew S. represent a continued trend in the California courts to abrogate the
conclusive presumption of paternity.245 Now, with the addition of the exceptions in section 7611, unwed fathers who have
established relationships with their children have an opportunity to rebut the presumption of the mother's husband's paternity.246 These two recent cases bolster this power to challenge
the presumption of paternity both by acknowledging the importance of a developed parent-child relationship and by demonstrating how the section 7611(d) rebuttable presumption can
operate to overcome the section 7540 conclusive presumption. 247 The unwed father no longer needs to wage a constitu242. JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD chs.
2-3 (1973) (The authors proposed that continuity in a child's relationships, environment, and surroundings is essential for the child's intellectual, emotional, physical,
social, and moral growth. The authors emphasized how the importance of these
elements is underestimated by adults.); RUTH S. PARRY ET AL., CUSTODY DISPUTES:
EVALUATION AND INTERVENTION 67 (1986) (Continuity of care for the children
found to have influenced at least 60% of all custody recommendations in control
group.).
243. Anderson, supra note 241, at 872. "Clinging to nostalgic notions of the
nuclear family or rigid presumptions of parenthood based on status facilitates the
displacement of functioning fathers, resulting in harm to children." Id.
244. See Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 632. "First, as our society has become
more pluralistic, it has become increasingly more difficult for law to accommodate
diverse views about family morals. It is therefore less acceptable for the state to
expect conformity with any particular family pattern as ideal." Id. See also, Traci
Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 389 (1988).
245. See, e.g., Comino v. Kelly, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994);
Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995); In re
Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989); In re Guardianship of
Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990).
246. E.g., Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535.
247. See supra part III for complete discussion.
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tional attack to be heard on the importance of his relationship
with his child.
While the statutory amendments are encouraging for the
unwed father, until the conclusive presumption is repealed,
unwed fathers remain at an unfair, unfounded disadvantage to
the mother's husband. Due to the changing face of the fami1y248 and the absence of the stigma of illegitimacy,249
California courts are less apt to find the conclusive presumption of paternity.250 Section 7540 has become a procedural
hindrance to ensuring a child's emotional stability inasmuch as
it still runs the risk of depriving a child of the only father he
or she knoWS. 251
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts and the social scientists agree that paternity
determinations which focus on the child's existing relationships
more often benefit the child. In stark contrast, the conclusive
presumption of section 7540 maintains a technical definition of
paternity based on the outmoded assumption that any marital
family is better than none. Contemporary families warrant
contemporary legal standards. Thus, the conclusive presumption of paternity of California Family Code section 7540 should
be repealed.

Batya F. Smernoff

248. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 79 tbl. 97, 80 tbl. 101 (114th ed. 1994). In 1991, 28 percent of births in
the nation and 33.3 percent of the births in California were to unwed mothers. Id.
249. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 1994). Section 7602 states: ''The parent and
child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of
the marital status of the parents." Id.
250. See, e.g., In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989); In re Guardianship
of Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1990); Fuss v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 46
(1991); County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (1993); Alicia R. v.
Timothy M., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (1994).
251. See supra part II.C.
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